Country: Poland

Years: 1945-1955

Head of government: Bolesław Bierut

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) elaborates, writing that “formal communist involvement in Polish politics ended when the PZPR voted to disband”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Bierut’s ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 642) identifies Bierut’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Beirut] became a communist during World War I and worked as a party organizer after the war.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1972.

Years: 1956-1969

Head of government: Władysław Gomułka

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1168) identifies Gomulka’s ideology as leftist, writing that “Gomulka returned to the leadership of the PZPR as the symbol of the ‘Polish path to socialism’”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 640) identifies Gomulka’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Gomulka] became an organizer for the banned Communist Party in the 1920s and was arrested on several occasions.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1972.

Years: 1970-1979

Head of government: Edward Gierek

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) elaborates, writing that “formal communist involvement in Polish politics ended when the PZPR voted to disband”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1972, and “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1976.

Year: 1980

Head of government: Stanisław Kania

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) elaborates, writing that “formal communist involvement in Polish politics ended when the PZPR voted to disband”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Lentz (1994: 650) identifies Kania’s ideology as leftist, writing that “[Kania] joined the Communist Party in 1945 and served as an organizer of the party’s youth movement.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1980.

Years: 1981-1988

Head of government: Wojciech Witold Jaruzelski

Ideology: left

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies party as PZPR, or Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). DPI identifies PUWP’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) elaborates, writing that “formal communist involvement in Polish politics ended when the PZPR voted to disband”. Manzano (2017) identifies ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) writes that “Jaruzelski presented to the PZPR Central Committee a number of proposed economic and political reforms that far outstripped Mikhail Gorbachev's “restructuring” agenda for the Soviet Union. Central to their implementation, however, was a strict austerity program that included massive price increases and was bitterly opposed by the outlawed Solidarity leadership”. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Jaruzelski’s ideology as leftist. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PZPR’s party family as communist/socialist. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PUWP as leftist, writing that “the disbanding of the Polish United Workers’ Party gave rise to many left-wing parties, and the fragmentation of Solidarity after 1990 led to a multiplication of right-wing parties”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1980 and “Far-left” (-4.047) in 1985.

Years: 1989-1990

Head of government: Tadeusz Mazowiecki

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government. Encyclopedia Britannica identifies Mazowiecki’s party as the Democratic Union (UD), writing that “just prior to the 1990 elections, Mazowiecki served as founder and first chairman of the Democratic Union (now Freedom Union)”. Armingeon et al. (2018) identify both UD’s and the Freedom Union’s ideologies as rightist. Döring and Manow (2019) identify UD’s party family as liberal.

Year: 1991

Head of government: Jan Olszewski

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government. Jasiewicz (1992: 62) identifies Olszewski’s party affiliation as the Center Civic Alliance (Porozumienie Obywatelskie Centrum - POC), writing that “another leader of the [Center Alliance] party, Jan Olszewski, overcame Walesa’s resistance and acquired the premiership”. Jasiewicz (1992: 62) further identifies POC’s ideology as rightist, writing that POC was “a self-described center-right party that cites ‘Christian values’ as its ideological base”. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1169) corroborates Olszewski’s ideology as rightist, writing that “the action had long been sought by the right-of-center Olszewski government”. Lentz (1994: 648) writes that “[Olszewski] was a critic of free market reforms.” Döring and Manow (2019) identify PC’s party family as Christian democratic. Tworzecki (1996: 406) identifies Olszewski as rightist, writing that “in addition to Walesa, right-of-centre voters were offered the choice of Hanna Gronkiewicz-Walts, the head of the Central Bank, Jan Olszewski, the leader of the Movement for the Republic (RdR)”. Jeffries (2002: 249) identifies Olszewski as rightist, writing that “Most of these defectors have joined the Patriotic Movement for the Fatherland, an embryonic party formed by seven ex-AWSers and four other right-wing MPs led by Jan Olszewski, a former prime minister.” Osiatynski (1995: 36) writes that “Walesa lost political ground in the center. Personal ambitions of center-right leaders led to the feud between Walesa and Jaroslaw Kazzynski (CA) and Jan Olszewski.” Ost (2007: 83) writes that “the Olszewski government was the first to criticize shock therapy and the post-1989 economic reforms, but it never followed through on any of its criticisms. Though it came to power promising an end to the neo-liberal Balcerowicz Plan, it soon ended up reproducing it. … It railed against IMF austerity measures, and then meekly agreed to all conditions. … Oldzewski supported the free market but claimed that in Poland it did not exist: the market was run by communists and it was these bad individuals that caused the economic hardships. … [Olszewski] offered a discourse that attacked the actually existing market economy in the name of an idealized one. ‘The invisible hand of the market,’ Olszewski said famously, was ‘simply the hand of the swindler plundering public funds from the state treasury.’ The remark outraged liberals, who thought it would undermine support for the market economy. But it is better interpreted as an attempt to maintain support for the market in face of increasing opposition. Olszewski lauded free markets and privatization when they were ‘done right’. … He aimed to turn the already burgeoning economic anger, against which the liberals were doing nothing, into anger directed at political enemies instead.” Stone (2002: 105) writes that “a shaky coalition of small right-wing parties united primarily by their conservative preferences on social policy formed under Jan Olszewski (Center Alliance or PC) … Olszewski had campaigned as a vocal opponent of shock therapy and was hoping to deliver on his promise to relax the pace of reform and bring the country out of recession. Several of Olszewski’s other potential coalition members also favored reflation, lower interest rates, renegotiating Poland’s agreements with the IMF, and increasing government aid to state-owned industries and farmers.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (0.449) in 1991. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify head of government party’s cohesion as “Negligible visible disagreement” in 1991.

Year: 1992

Head of government: Hanna Suchocka

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1169) identifies Suchocka’s party affiliation as the Democratic Union (*Unia Demokratyczna*—UD), writing that “on July 6 1992, the UD’s Hanna Suchocka was confirmed as Poland’s first female prime minister”. Armingeon et al. (2018) identify UD’s ideology as rightist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Suchocka’s ideology as leftist. Döring and Manow (2019) identify UD’s party family as liberal.

Years: 1993-1994

Head of government: Waldemar Pawlak

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1169) identifies Pawlak’s party affiliation as the Polish Peasant’s Party (Partia Stronnictwo Ludowe —PSL), writing that “the Sejm endorsed Waldemar Pawlak, the relatively obscure leader of the PSL, as new prime minister”. Armingeon et al. (2018) identify PSL’s ideology as leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Pawlak’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) as 3.8. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PSL’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 2.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PSL’s party family as agrarian. Hass (2006: 1092) identifies PSL as leftist, writing that “like the SdRP, the PSL favors slower implementation of market reforms and an increased presence of the state in regulatory and social safety–net functions that can provide all citizens, especially peasants, with the opportunity to participate in political and social life. The PSL claims to adhere to “agrarianism,” a philosophy that supports market democracy with a state capable of addressing excesses and problems; agrarianism also exalts the peasantry and its historical role in society and proclaims the need to protect peasants from potential inequalities that occur with economic and social change. Echoing the Socialist rhetoric of its past, the PSL claims exploitation should be addressed and should not be the cornerstone of an economy; in Socialist fashion, the PSL stresses that social interests come before (exploitative) economic interests. Interestingly, the PSL’s seeming leftism does not entirely extend into the sphere of social issues.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.515) in 1993.

Year: 1995

Head of government: Józef Oleksy

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1170) identifies Oleksy’s party affiliation as the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej—SLD), writing that “the two coalition parties were resolved to enable the SLD’s Jozef Oleksy, a communist-era minister, to be sworn in as prime minister”. DPI identifies SLD’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1170) elaborates, writing that “the balloting of September 19, 1993, yielded a pronounced swing to the left, with the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej—SLD) winning 37 percent of the legislative seats”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms SLD to be leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1170) confirms Oleksy’s ideology as leftist, writing that “Collateral strains between the two coalition parties were resolved sufficiently to enable the SLD's Józef OLEKSY, a Communist-era minister, to be sworn in on March 6 as prime minister”. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify SLD’s support-oppose welfare score as 4 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify SLD’s party family as social democracy. Hass (2006: 1092) identifies SLD as leftist, writing that “SLD began as an alliance of social-democratic parties led by the Social-Democratic Party of Poland (Socjal-Demokracja Rzecspolpolita Polskiego; SdRP). The heir to the Communist party, SdRP and SLD threw off the old image of Soviet Communism and embraced a more Western social-democratic image, including a sleeker, younger, Western-looking presidential candidate (Kwasniewski) in 1995. While critical of radical shock therapy in the 1990s, SLD did support pro-market reforms following a more gradual approach, which Poland eventually adopted. SLD supports a regulatory state in the economy, multiparty liberal democracy, and an active state role in welfare and other social defenses, although it does not go so far as to support large subsidies as some agricultural parties do. … Throughout the 1990s the SLD moved to capture the center ground. This was made possible by weakness of parties to the left—most leftist parties are either very marginal, radical Socialist parties, or agricultural parties such as the PSL—and the collapse of the Solidarity alliances to the center-right. Interestingly, SLD’s center-left position resembled the change in the British Labor Party under Tony Blair (“New Labor,” which rejected many of its historically Socialist programs, such as nationalization of industry).” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.748) in 1993.

Year: 1996

Head of government: Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1170) identifies Cimoszewicz’s party affiliation as the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej—SLD), writing that prime minister “Kwasniewski was replaced on February 8, 1996 by Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz of the SLD”. DPI identifies SLD’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1170) elaborates, writing that “the balloting of September 19, 1993, yielded a pronounced swing to the left, with the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej—SLD) winning 37 percent of the legislative seats”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms SLD to be leftist. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify SLD’s support-oppose welfare score as 4 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify SLD’s party family as social democracy. Hass (2006: 1092) identifies SLD as leftist, writing that “SLD began as an alliance of social-democratic parties led by the Social-Democratic Party of Poland (Socjal-Demokracja Rzecspolpolita Polskiego; SdRP). The heir to the Communist party, SdRP and SLD threw off the old image of Soviet Communism and embraced a more Western social-democratic image, including a sleeker, younger, Western-looking presidential candidate (Kwasniewski) in 1995. While critical of radical shock therapy in the 1990s, SLD did support pro-market reforms following a more gradual approach, which Poland eventually adopted. SLD supports a regulatory state in the economy, multiparty liberal democracy, and an active state role in welfare and other social defenses, although it does not go so far as to support large subsidies as some agricultural parties do. … Throughout the 1990s the SLD moved to capture the center ground. This was made possible by weakness of parties to the left—most leftist parties are either very marginal, radical Socialist parties, or agricultural parties such as the PSL—and the collapse of the Solidarity alliances to the center-right. Interestingly, SLD’s center-left position resembled the change in the British Labor Party under Tony Blair (“New Labor,” which rejected many of its historically Socialist programs, such as nationalization of industry).” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.748) in 1993.

Years: 1997-2000

Head of government: Jerzy Karol Buzek

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1170) identifies Buzek’s party affiliation as the Social Movement-Solidarity Electoral Action (Ruch Społeczny-Akija Wyborcza Solidarność—RS-AWS), writing that the AWS “formed a new government on October 31, 1997 with Jerzy Buzek of the leading AWS party, the RS-AWS, as prime minister”. Political Handbook (2018: 1170) further identifies RS-AWS’s ideology as rightist, writing that “in June 1996 Solidarity began organizing small centre-right parties into the Solidarity Electoral Action”. Döring and Manow (2019) identify AWS’s party family as Christian democratic. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (0.317) in 1997. In V-Party (2020), 3 experts identify head of government party’s cohesion as “Some visible disagreement” in 1997.

Years: 2001-2003

Head of government: Leszek Cezary Miller

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1170) identifies Miller’s party affiliation as the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej—SLD), writing that “the SLD/UP completed a coalition agreement with the rural PSL that permitted the SLD’s Leszek Miller … to become prime minister of an SLD-dominated cabinet”. DPI identifies SLD’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1170) elaborates, writing that “the balloting of September 19, 1993, yielded a pronounced swing to the left, with the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej—SLD) winning 37 percent of the legislative seats”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms SLD to be leftist. Perspective Monde (2019) identifies Miller’s ideology as leftist. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify SLD’s support-oppose welfare score as 4 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify SLD’s party family as social democracy. Hass (2006: 1092) identifies SLD as leftist, writing that “SLD began as an alliance of social-democratic parties led by the Social-Democratic Party of Poland (Socjal-Demokracja Rzecspolpolita Polskiego; SdRP). The heir to the Communist party, SdRP and SLD threw off the old image of Soviet Communism and embraced a more Western social-democratic image, including a sleeker, younger, Western-looking presidential candidate (Kwasniewski) in 1995. While critical of radical shock therapy in the 1990s, SLD did support pro-market reforms following a more gradual approach, which Poland eventually adopted. SLD supports a regulatory state in the economy, multiparty liberal democracy, and an active state role in welfare and other social defenses, although it does not go so far as to support large subsidies as some agricultural parties do. … Throughout the 1990s the SLD moved to capture the center ground. This was made possible by weakness of parties to the left—most leftist parties are either very marginal, radical Socialist parties, or agricultural parties such as the PSL—and the collapse of the Solidarity alliances to the center-right. Interestingly, SLD’s center-left position resembled the change in the British Labor Party under Tony Blair (“New Labor,” which rejected many of its historically Socialist programs, such as nationalization of industry).” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (-0.256) in 2001. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify head of government party’s cohesion as “Negligible visible disagreement” in 2001.

Year: 2004

Head of government: Marek Belka

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1170) identifies Belka’s party affiliation as the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej—SLD), writing that “President Kwasniewski immedietly designated ‘technocrat’ Marek Belka of the SLD to succeed Miller”. DPI identifies SLD’s ideology as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1170) elaborates, writing that “the balloting of September 19, 1993, yielded a pronounced swing to the left, with the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Democratycznej—SLD) winning 37 percent of the legislative seats”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms SLD to be leftist. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify SLD’s support-oppose welfare score as 4 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify SLD’s party family as social democracy. Hass (2006: 1092) identifies SLD as leftist, writing that “SLD began as an alliance of social-democratic parties led by the Social-Democratic Party of Poland (Socjal-Demokracja Rzecspolpolita Polskiego; SdRP). The heir to the Communist party, SdRP and SLD threw off the old image of Soviet Communism and embraced a more Western social-democratic image, including a sleeker, younger, Western-looking presidential candidate (Kwasniewski) in 1995. While critical of radical shock therapy in the 1990s, SLD did support pro-market reforms following a more gradual approach, which Poland eventually adopted. SLD supports a regulatory state in the economy, multiparty liberal democracy, and an active state role in welfare and other social defenses, although it does not go so far as to support large subsidies as some agricultural parties do. … Throughout the 1990s the SLD moved to capture the center ground. This was made possible by weakness of parties to the left—most leftist parties are either very marginal, radical Socialist parties, or agricultural parties such as the PSL—and the collapse of the Solidarity alliances to the center-right. Interestingly, SLD’s center-left position resembled the change in the British Labor Party under Tony Blair (“New Labor,” which rejected many of its historically Socialist programs, such as nationalization of industry).” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (-0.256) in 2001. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify head of government party’s cohesion as “Negligible visible disagreement” in 2001.

Year: 2005

Head of government: Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1117) identifies Marcinkiewicz’s party affiliation as the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawieliwość—PiS), writing that “the PiS named Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as its choice for prime minister”. DPI identifies PiS’s ideology as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the plurality achieved by the rightist PiS surprised observers across Europe”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms PiS to be rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2019) identifies Marcinkiewicz’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Law and Justice (PiS) as 2.9. Norris (2020: 15) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values”. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PiS’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 3.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PiS’s party family as conservative. Gwiazda (2008: 761) identifies PiS as social-conservative, writing that “the social-conservative PiS advocates a strong state, a traditional social order, rigorous law and order principles, and declared the fight against crime and corruption as priorities.” Millard (2007: 213) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “In the last stages of the parliamentary campaign, PiS benefited from a shift in the Kaczyński's strategy. With no serious challenge from the left … PiS concentrated on attacking PO. Lech Kaczyński posed a stark choice between PO's ‘liberal Poland’, serving the rich, and PiS's ‘social’ or ‘solidary’ Poland. PiS stressed concern for the poor, promising to end the scandal of ‘hungry children’ and opposing the regressive implications of PO's flat tax.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (0.089) in 2005. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify head of government party’s cohesion as “Negligible visible disagreement” in 2005. Kulesza (2013) states that PiS’s election platform in 2015 included “change in economic policy consisting of economic patriotism, through weakening the position of the banks and multinational companies” and “introducing the highest social transfer since 1989 (announcement of lowering the retirement age, financial support for families with more than one child called the 500+ program, increasing the threshold before which people have to pay tax; the introduction of a minimum hourly wage, etc.)” Ciobanu (2021) describes proposals made by the PiS to appeal to lower-class Polish voters by pursuing redistributive social policies, including restructuring the tax system to divert money from the rich to the low/middle class population, and increasing government spending on healthcare.

Years: 2006

Head of government: Jaroslaw Aleksander Kaczynski

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1117) identifies Kaczynski’s party affiliation as the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawieliwość—PiS), writing that President Kaczynski nominated his “twin brother Jaroslaw Kaczynski (the chair of the PiS) … as prime minister on July 14, 2016. DPI identifies PiS’s ideology as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the plurality achieved by the rightist PiS surprised observers across Europe”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms PiS to be rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2019) identifies Kaczynski’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Law and Justice (PiS) as 2.9. Norris (2020: 15) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values”. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PiS’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 3.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PiS’s party family as conservative. . Gwiazda (2008: 761) identifies PiS as social-conservative, writing that “the social-conservative PiS advocates a strong state, a traditional social order, rigorous law and order principles, and declared the fight against crime and corruption as priorities.” Millard (2007: 213) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “In the last stages of the parliamentary campaign, PiS benefited from a shift in the Kaczyński's strategy. With no serious challenge from the left … PiS concentrated on attacking PO. Lech Kaczyński posed a stark choice between PO's ‘liberal Poland’, serving the rich, and PiS's ‘social’ or ‘solidary’ Poland. PiS stressed concern for the poor, promising to end the scandal of ‘hungry children’ and opposing the regressive implications of PO's flat tax.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center” (0.089) in 2005. In V-Party (2020), 6 experts identify head of government party’s cohesion as “Negligible visible disagreement” in 2005. Funke et. al (2020) code Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski as “right-wing populist,” although profile states, “Economic grievances are not at the center of their discourse.” Kulesza (2013) states that PiS’s election platform in 2015 included “change in economic policy consisting of economic patriotism, through weakening the position of the banks and multinational companies” and “introducing the highest social transfer since 1989 (announcement of lowering the retirement age, financial support for families with more than one child called the 500+ program, increasing the threshold before which people have to pay tax; the introduction of a minimum hourly wage, etc.)” Ciobanu (2021) describes proposals made by the PiS to appeal to lower-class Polish voters by pursuing redistributive social policies, including restructuring the tax system to divert money from the rich to the low/middle class population, and increasing government spending on healthcare.

Years: 2007-2013

Head of government: Donald Tusk

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1117) identifies Tusk’s party affiliation as the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska—PO). DPI identifies PO’s ideology as centrist, but its source Lansford (2015) only identifies Tusk’s coalition government as centrist, writing “Donald Tusk formed a centrist government on November 16, 2007 comprising the PO and the PSL”. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the coalition crisis endured for several weeks, prompting a PiS meeting with its rival, the center-right PO”. Armingeon et al. (2018) confirm PO’s own ideology as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2019) identifies Tusk’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Civic Platform (PO) as 7.7. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PO’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 6.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PO’s party family as conservative. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PO as rightist, writing that “the party favors conservative economic policies such as increased privatization and reduced power for labor unions”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.544) in 2007, and “Center-right” (0.544) in 2011.

Year: 2014

Head of government: Ewa Kopacz

Ideology: rightist

HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1174) identifies Kopacz’s party affiliation as the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska—PO), writing that the PO leadership included “Ewa Kopacz (First Chair of the Party). DPI identifies PO’s ideology as centrist, but its source Lansford (2015) only identifies Tusk’s coalition government as centrist, writing “Donald Tusk formed a centrist government on November 16, 2007 comprising the PO and the PSL”. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the coalition crisis endured for several weeks, prompting a PiS meeting with its rival, the center-right PO”. Armingeon et al. (2018) confirm PO’s ideology as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2019) identifies Kopacz’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of the Civic Platform (PO) as 7.7. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PO’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 6.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PO’s party family as conservative. Hass (2006: 1091) identifies PO as rightist, writing that “the party favors conservative economic policies such as increased privatization and reduced power for labor unions”. In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.544) in 2011.

Years: 2015-2016

Head of government: Beata Maria Szydlo

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Political Handbook (2018: 1175) identifies Szydlo’s party affiliation as the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawieliwość—PiS), writing that the PiS leadership included Beata Szydlo as one of the Vice Presidents of the party. DPI identifies PiS’s ideology as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the plurality achieved by the rightist PiS surprised observers across Europe”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms PiS to be rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2019) identifies Szydlo’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Law and Justice (PiS) as 2.9. Norris (2020: 15) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values”. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PiS’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 3.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PiS’s party family as conservative. . Gwiazda (2008: 761) identifies PiS as social-conservative, writing that “the social-conservative PiS advocates a strong state, a traditional social order, rigorous law and order principles, and declared the fight against crime and corruption as priorities.” Millard (2007: 213) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “In the last stages of the parliamentary campaign, PiS benefited from a shift in the Kaczyński's strategy. With no serious challenge from the left … PiS concentrated on attacking PO. Lech Kaczyński posed a stark choice between PO's ‘liberal Poland’, serving the rich, and PiS's ‘social’ or ‘solidary’ Poland. PiS stressed concern for the poor, promising to end the scandal of ‘hungry children’ and opposing the regressive implications of PO's flat tax.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.778) in 2015. Kulesza (2013) states that PiS’s election platform in 2015 included “change in economic policy consisting of economic patriotism, through weakening the position of the banks and multinational companies” and “introducing the highest social transfer since 1989 (announcement of lowering the retirement age, financial support for families with more than one child called the 500+ program, increasing the threshold before which people have to pay tax; the introduction of a minimum hourly wage, etc.)” Ciobanu (2021) describes proposals made by the PiS to appeal to lower-class Polish voters by pursuing redistributive social policies, including restructuring the tax system to divert money from the rich to the low/middle class population, and increasing government spending on healthcare.

Year: 2017-2020

Head of government: Mateusz Jakub Morawiecki

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS does not identify head of government’s party affiliation. Encyclopedia Britannica (2019) identifies Morawiecki’s party affiliation as the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawieliwość—PiS). Political Handbook of the World (2015: 1171) elaborates, writing that “the plurality achieved by the rightist PiS surprised observers across Europe”. Armingeon et al. (2019) confirms PiS to be rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2019) identifies Morawiecki’s ideology as rightist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 15 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of Law and Justice (PiS) as 2.9. Norris (2020: 15) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “parties using populist rhetoric fall across the economic spectrum, for example, Poland’s Law and Justice party (in common with many Eastern European populist parties) is socialist towards the economy and welfare state but highly traditional in its social values”. Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) identify PiS’s support-oppose welfare score as approximately 3.5 on a scale from 1-7. Döring and Manow (2019) identify PiS’s party family as conservative. . Gwiazda (2008: 761) identifies PiS as social-conservative, writing that “the social-conservative PiS advocates a strong state, a traditional social order, rigorous law and order principles, and declared the fight against crime and corruption as priorities.” Millard (2007: 213) identifies PiS as leftist, writing that “In the last stages of the parliamentary campaign, PiS benefited from a shift in the Kaczyński's strategy. With no serious challenge from the left … PiS concentrated on attacking PO. Lech Kaczyński posed a stark choice between PO's ‘liberal Poland’, serving the rich, and PiS's ‘social’ or ‘solidary’ Poland. PiS stressed concern for the poor, promising to end the scandal of ‘hungry children’ and opposing the regressive implications of PO's flat tax.” In V-Party (2020), 7 experts identify head of government party’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.778) in 2015 and “Center-left” (-0.848) in 2019. DPI identifies PiS as rightist. Kulesza (2013) states that PiS’s election platform in 2015 included “change in economic policy consisting of economic patriotism, through weakening the position of the banks and multinational companies” and “introducing the highest social transfer since 1989 (announcement of lowering the retirement age, financial support for families with more than one child called the 500+ program, increasing the threshold before which people have to pay tax; the introduction of a minimum hourly wage, etc.)” Ciobanu (2021) describes proposals made by the PiS to appeal to lower-class Polish voters by pursuing redistributive social policies, including restructuring the tax system to divert money from the rich to the low/middle class population, and increasing government spending on healthcare.

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